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11936

-vsJOHN W. TURNER, Warden,
Utah State Prison,
Defendant-Respondent.

:
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STATEMENT OF POINTS ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
POINT A
THERE IS A STATUTORY PRESUMPTION
THAT REVISED STATUTES WILL NOT APPLY
RETROACTIVELY UNLESS EXPRESSLY SO DECLARED.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 68-3-3 (1953).

POINT B
THE EFFECT OF THE SUPREME
COURT'S DECISION WILL BE TO TURN LOOSE
ALL THOSE PERSONS WHO WERE SENTENCED
(OR ARE NOW AWAITING SENTENCING) UNDER
THE PRIOR LAW AFTER THE EFFECTIVE DATE
OF THE NEW LAW.
POINT C
THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION
WHEN APPLIED TO STATUTES INCREASING
PENAL SANCTIONS WILL CREATE AN EX POST
FACTO LAW IN VIOLATION OF STATE AND
FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS.
POINT D
ALL PERSONS SENTENCED UNDER
PRIOR LAWS WHEN REVISED LAWS WERE AVAILABLE HAVE A VALID CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST

- 2 -

THE STATE OF UTAH FOR CIVIL DAMAGES
UNDER THE EQUAL PRO'IECTION CLAUSE OF
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND THE
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT § 1983.
ARGUMENT
POINT A
THERE IS A STATUTORY PRESUMPTION THAT REVISED STATUTES WILL NOT APPLY
.RETROACTIVELY UNLESS EXPRESSLY SO DECLARED.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 68-3-3 (1953).
The Utah Code Annotated 1953
specifically codifies a long-standing
presumption from the common law regarding
the retroactivity of revised statutes.
It states in Section 68-3-3:

"No part of

these revised statutes is retroactive
expressly so declared."

- 3 -

With this statute

in mind, we must also consider what
retroactive means in terms of revised
or repealed statutes.
§ 68-3-5

(1953)

Utah Code Ann.

indicates that any time

an action has been commenced under a
given statute, its repeal does not
affect the proceedings:
"The repeal of a
statute does not revive
a statute previously
repealed, or affect any
right which has accrued,
any duty imposed, any
penalty incurred, or any
action or proceeding commenced under or by virtue
of the statute repealed."
(Emphasis added.)
The meaning of the Utah Code
in these sections giving instructions
as to proper statutory construction is
clear.

When laws are revised, they may
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not apply retroactively unless specifically provided.

When laws are repealed

the prior law must still take effect in
all actions or proceedings commenced
under or by virtue of the repealed
statute.

Buttrey v. Guaranteed Secu-

rities Co. et. al., 78 Utah 39, 300 P.
1040 (1931).
This presumption of prospective
application of revised statutes has been
codified in Utah since before it became
a state.

The case law accordingly dis-

plays a long line of authority in support
of prospective application of revised
statutes.
One of the early cases in Utah
relating to this problem is Farrell v.

- 5 -

Pingree, 5 Utah 443, 16 P. 843 (1888)
where a new law was passed limiting
the term of county treasurers to two
years.

Farrell claimed to be rightfully

entitled to assume the office of treasurer
based on an election at the time the new
law took effect.

Pingree had only served

two years of a four year term and claimed
that the new statute could not apply
retroactively and have the effect of
limiting his term of office to two years.
The court held:
"No court will hold a
statute to be retroactive when
the legislature has not said
so, and there is no reason
why it should be so, and where
the statute is easily susceptible of another and reasonable
construction."
Id. at 448, 845.
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A similar holding is found in
Mercur Gold Mining & Milling co. v. Spry,
16 Utah 222, 52 P. 382 (1898) where a new
tax law was held not to have retroactive
application:
"Constitutions, as well
as statutes, should operate
prospectively only, unless
the words employed show a
clear intention that they
should have a retrospective
effect. This rule of construction as to statutes
should always be adhered to,
unless there be something on
the face of the statute putting it beyond doubt that the
legislature meant it to operate
retrospectively." Id. at 229,
384-385.
(See also Industrial
Commission v. Agee, 56 Utah 63,
189 P. 414 (1920) which cites
the Utah laws of statutory
construction and considers them
binding.)
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More recently, the Supreme
Court has affirmed this long-standing
law of statutory construction in
In re Ingraham's Estate, 106 Utah 337,
148 P.2d 340 (1944) and Union Pacific
R. Co. v. Trustees, Inc., 8 Utah 2d 101,
329 P.2d 398 (1958).
The Tenth Circuit has also had
occasion to interpret Utah law regarding
retroactivity.

In Kansas City Life Ins.

Co. v. Bowns, 129 F.2d 287 (1942), the
Circuit Court of Appeals considered the
retroactivity of laws relating to suicides
being a proper defense to a payment of
life insurance.

Bowns tried to claim the

benefits of a new law which shifted the
burden of proof in relationship to the
proof of suicide.

The court held that the
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contract entered into under former 1 aw.
could not be construed in light of the
new law retroactively.
"It is the general
rule in Utah, as elsewhere, that a statute
will be construed as
prospective only unless
it appears from the words
used or in some other
manner that the legislature
meant it to operate retroactively."
Id. at 288.
An application of these wellsettled laws of statutory construction
to our factual situation would provide
that Utah Code Ann. § 76-20-11 (1953)
should take full affect as it was in force
on October 14, 1968.

At that time, appel-

lant pleaded guilty and the cause of
action had commenced and was well into
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the proceedings.

The entire case should

therefore be treated as a cause of action
arising under Utah Code Ann. § 76-20-11
(1953) as it read in 1968.

The sentenc-

ing should likewise be pronounced under
that law.

State v. Miller, 24 Utah 2d 1,

464 P.2d 944 (1970) was correctly decided
and is controlling here.

Delayed sen-

tencing because of a probationary violation should not be used as a mere tool
to obtain application of the new penal
sanctions.
POINT B
THE EFFECT OF THE SUPREME
COURT'S DECISION WILL BE TO TURN LOOSE ALL
THOSE PERSONS WHO WERE SENTENCED (OR ARE
NOW AWAITING SENTENCING) UNDER THE PRIOR
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LAW AFTER THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE
NEW LAW.
The newly pronounced doctrine
found in the Supreme Court's decision
provides for the retroactive application
of new laws to cases where sentencing
has not been imposed yet.

This would

allow all those on provisional probation
(as appellant was before his probation
violation} to come into court for final
sentencing and determination under the
new law.

It would also allow those

actually sentenced under the prior law
after the new law effective date to
assert a valid claim under writ of habeas
corpus and compel resentencing under the
new law.
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According to the records of
the Division of Adult Parole and Probation and the Board of Corrections,
there are ten (10) persons now in prison
who were sentenced on a felony charge
for writing checks on insufficient funds
that were sentenced between October 14,
1968, when the appellant pleaded guilty
to the charges and May 13, 1969, when
Utah Code Ann. § 76-20-11 (2) (a)
1969) became effective.

(Supp.

Likewise, there

are another thirty-five (35) persons who
are similarly situated who are now on
probation.

The effect of the court's

decision will be to allow the release of
all these individuals who have already
been lawfully tried and convicted.
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Laws are created by the
Legislature as a statement of general
policies that the people of the State
desire to have enforced.

An important

concept in people being able to conduct
themselves lawfully is the predictability
of the application of laws.

Penal laws

have a certain deterrent effect and the
expectations of the public should be given
weight.

The appellant's violation was

committed under the former law, his
apprehension was attained under the former
law, his case was commenced and decided
under the former law and his probationary
condition was assigned under the former
law.

It is inconceivable that a violation

of his terms of probation should now allow
him to claim retroactively the benefits.
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of a new law.
POINT C
THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION
WHEN APPLIED TO STATUTES INCREASING
PENAL SANCTIONS WILL CREATE AN EX POST
FACTO LAW IN VIOLATION OF STATE AND
FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS.
If the decision of the court
is sound it would likewise apply to
revised statutes where the penal sanctions become more severe.

The court

purports to announce a rule of law that
a new law should apply to any judicial
determinations that are made after the
effective date of the new statute.

As

such, persons acting in accordance with
prior law when it is actually in force
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may be harmed by reliance on the prior
law if the new law is in effect.
This retroactively applied
liability is the very essence of the
post facto laws prohibited by State
and Federal Constitutions:
"No bill of attainder,
ex post facto law, or law
impairing the obligation
of contracts shall be passed."
(Emphasis added.)
Utah State
Constitution, Art. I § 18.
"No bill of attainder,
or
post facto law shall
be passed."
(Emphasis added.)
United States Constitution,
Art. I § 9.
The logical application of the
law set forth in the Supreme Court's
decision is that if the penalty had been
increased for writing checks on insufficient funds, the appellant would have
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been sentenced for the greater period
of time.

Such an application of the

law is violative of the State and Federal Constitutions relating to ex post
facto laws.
POINT D
ALL PERSONS SENTENCED UNDER
PRIOR LAWS WHERE NEW LAWS WERE AVAILABLE
HAVE A VALID CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE
STATE OF UTAH FOR CIVIL DAMAGES UNDER
THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND THE CIVIL
RIGHTS ACT § 1983.

By applying a rule of construction in the instant case in a different
manner than prior applications made,
persons thereby prejudiced have a valid
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cause of action under the equal protection clause of the United States
Constitution.

Such a cause of action

may be made to obtain civil damages
under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights
Act:
"Every person who,
under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State
or Territory, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States
or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceedings
for redress."
The State acting under color
of law has effectuated a discriminatory
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application of the law in using the
prior law to sentence the appellant
where if the decision is allowed to
stand the later enactment should have
been used.

All persons who were sen-

tenced in accordance with the statutory
rules of construction under the prior
provision now have a cause of action
under the equal protection clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.

The State will

have to respond to suits for civil
damages under Section 1983.
CONCLUSION
The respondent submits that
the Supreme Court's decision did not
properly take into account the rules of
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statutory construction outlined by
Utah Code Ann. §§ 68-3-3 and 68-3-5
(1953) .

The implications of such a

decision are far reaching in that
sentenced persons may be turned loose,
the new rule may violate

post facto

safeguards and the State may be subjected to excessive civil liability.
For these reasons, the respondent submits that the case should be reheard,
reconsidered, and the decision of
January 20, 1971, be vacated.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
LAUREN N. BEASLEY
Chief Assistant Attorney
General
Attorneys for Respondent
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